6 articles
A coordinated disclosure reveals that attacker-controlled instructions in a Word document can hijack Copilot, alter financial data, and self-propagate across documents. Microsoft cannot fully fix the vulnerability class. The HN community draws parallels to the macro virus era.
New role-confusion research explains why prompt injection keeps surviving better prompts. Models do not reliably perceive which text is instruction, tool output, user content, or their own reasoning.
Security researchers showed a €0.02 bank transfer could compromise a banking AI assistant. Here is the exact attack chain - and what every developer building agents needs to do differently.
The ChatGPT for Google Sheets exfiltration report is not just a spreadsheet bug. It is a warning about agentic office tools: permissions need to be action-scoped, logged, revocable, and visible.
Prompt injection stops being an abstract LLM risk once an agent can call tools. The practical defense is data boundaries, structured handoffs, tool guardrails, and approval gates around side effects.
AI coding agents now read repository docs, config, issues, and comments before opening pull requests. That turns CONTRIBUTING.md and AGENTS.md into part of the security boundary.
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